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Campbell: Some Facts About the Theory of Fiction

Some Facts about the Theory of

Fictions
Harry M. Campbell

ONE of the most influential ideas in the modern world has been
the theory of fictions, which received its fullest treatment in the book
entitled The Philosophy of 'As If (by the German philosopher Hans
Vaihinger), written around 1875 but not published until 1911. This
book was so successful on the Continent that Vaihinger in 1919, in
collaboration with Dr. Raymond Schmidt, founded, a magazine,
Annalen der Philosophic (“with particular reference to the problems
of the 'As if approach”)? contributors to which included “not
professional philosophers (Cornelius, Groos, Becher, Bergman,
Koffka, Kowaleski) but also eminent representatives of the most
important branches of science, the theologian Heim, the lawyer
Kruchman, the doctor Abderhalden, the mathematician Pasch, the
physicist Volkman, the biological botanist Hansen, the economist
Pohle, and the art-historian Lange?’1 The fame of Vaihinger’ work
quickly spread to England, where his book was translated into English
by C. K. Ogden and published in 1924 in the International Library of
Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method, of
Ogden was
general editor. Ogden hailed the book as “monumental”2 and later
(in his introduction to Jeremy Bentham’s earlier book on the same
subject,
he reprinted in the International Library in 1932)
added that “Today a Philosophy of As-if dominates scientific
thought.”3 The fame of Vaihinger’s work had become world wide so
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that, although The Philosophy of 'As If' is written in a rather tech
nical and (for the most part) dry style, a second edition (English)
appeared in 1935 and a reprinting in 1949. That Vaihinger’ tremen
dous influence was not limited to scientific thought but had permeated
all aspects of modem philosophy was attested by Etienne Gilson, who,
in his book The Unity of Philosophical Experience (1952), said:
For what is now called philosophy is either collective
mental slavery or scepticism. There still are men who hate
both, and will not lament the passing of that alternative.
But it will not pass away so long as the title of Vaihinger’s
book remains the program of our philosophical teaching:
The Philosophy of the As If being a system of the theo
retical, practical and religious fictions of mankind, on the
basis of an idealistic philosophy. . . . The time
the
'As ifs’ is over; what we now need is a 'This is so,’ and we
shall not find it, unless we first recover both our lost
confidence in the rational validity of metaphysics and our
long-forgotten knowledge of its object.4
Jeremy Bentham’s book entitled Chrestomathia or Theory of Fictions5
published in 1815, still in several ways superior to Vaihinger’s, but
since Bentham’ work has for the most part been either ignored or
dismissed (as Ogden says in his introduction to the edition referred
to above), “with contemptuous reference,” and since Vaihinger’s work
has had such a great influence on modern thought, it seems appropriate
to reconsider Vaihinger to try to understand the reason for the great
appeal of his system.
In the beginning, it may be noted that Vaihinger, while claiming
to be most carefully scientific in his approach, assures the reader that
both biological and spiritual benefits may be derived from the planned
use in one’ life of fictions, which he carefully defines as “hypotheses
which are known to be false, but which are employed because of their
utility” (HV, p. xliii). Biologically, thought, when used in this
fashion, acts “as a means in the service of the Will to Live and
dominate” (HV, p. xlvi). But this is only the beginning, from which
mighty spiritual benefits will eventually flow. “Thus, before our very
eyes does a small psychical artifice not only develop into a mighty
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source of the whole theoretical explanation of the world—for all
categories arise from it—but it. also becomes the origin of all the
idealistic belief and behaviour of mankind” (HV, p. 49). Surely,
such a wonder-working device deserves our most careful consideration,
even if we may be inclined to decide that the promises made here are
almost as hard to believe as the miracles and paradoxes of religious
orthodoxy. Of course, from
standpoint, we are assured that we
need not believe anything. Vaihinger is a positivist, he tells us,
believing that “we must accept as actually real only certain sequences
of sensation” (HV, p. 68) and that “the psyche must be regarded as
a machine,” which “works according to psycho-mechanical and psycho
chemical laws ...” (HV, p. 101). All the rest is a process of fictions,
but, somewhat paradoxically to say the least, we must believe in the
amazing efficacy of these fictions.
And then, when we begin to examine Vaihinger’s
in detail,
we encounter a startling number of paradoxes which, even under the
most sympathetic inspection, prove to
dangerously like ordinary
contradictions. This disappointing tendency is apparent from the
beginning in his unqualified definition of fictions as “hypotheses which
are known to be false, but which are employed because of their
utility” (HV, p. xliii), utility, as he makes clear on the
page,
in the sense of ethical value. This in his Introduction, but a little
further on he tells us that fictions are useful only so long as they
are not known to be false. “We must accept as actually real
certain sequences of sensation, from which there
in accordance
with definite laws, structures that are treated as fictions” (HV, p. 68).
He refers here to “fictitious constructs” like space, matter, etc., which
“arise out of elementary sensations” and
as “products of the
psyche must also
regarded as fictions created by the logical impulse
in order to attain its goal,” but “ soon as the mechanism by means
of which these concepts perform such efficacious service is disclosed,
the illusion of their truth disappears” (HV, p. 69), and they should
be discarded. Here the fictions seem to be created by a benevolent,
though mechanical, device of nature to protect us from shock until
we are emotionally mature enough to dispense with “the illusion of
their truth.”
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But a problem arises from the relation between his original defini
tion of fictions as consciously false assumptions and his further
statement that we cannot know the world of reality, since “we must
accept as actually real only certain sequences of sensation” (HV, p.
68). “Many thought processes,” he says, “appear to be consciously false
assumptions,
either contradict reality or are even contradictory
in themselves, but
are intentionally transformed in order to
overcome difficulties of thought by this artificial deviation” (HV,
pp. xvli-xlvii). But if Vaihinger cannot know objective reality, how
can he know when it is contradicted? How can he know, in other
words, whether our thought processes may not, to some extent at
least, reflect reality? For example, why does Vaihinger include as
one of his “consciously false assumptions” the belief in a God? “It
is a satisfying Fiction,” he says, “for many to regard the world
if
a more perfect Higher Spirit had created or at least regulated it”
(HV, p. xlvii). Not even Bertrand Russell’s atheism
this dog
matic; Russell admits the possibility, though not the probability, that
there is a God. It would have seemed more logical for Vaihinger, like
Kant, to refer to God as an hypothesis, except for the fact that
Vaihinger considers an hypothesis as an assumption the truth of which
can
proved by further experience. At least, in view of the almost
universal belief in the existence of a Supreme Being, Vaihinger would
have seemed less narrowly dogmatic if he had considered God as what
Bentham, in his Theory of Fictions, called an “inferential entity.”
Bentham of course was a skeptic, but he was not willing to call God a
fictitious entity since the existence of such an entity could be scien
tifically no more disproved than proved. Bentham defined an in
ferential entity as one “which is not made known to human beings in
general, by the testimony of sense, but of the existence of which the
persuasion
produced by reflection— inferred from a chain of
reasoning.”0 Bentham also put in this category the soul considered as
existing in a state of separation from the body.
Vaihinger, as might be expected, runs into logical difficulty on the
problem of freedom. He says that “the idea of freedom is
of the
most important concepts ever formed by man,” though it is a fiction
since such an idea “contradicts observation which shows that every
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thing obeys unalterable laws” (HV, p. 43). Freedom, then, is a
fiction but an important one: “In the course of their development,
men have formed this important construct from immanent necessity,
because only on this basis is a high degree of culture and morality
possible” (HV, p. 43). We act as if there were freedom when there
really is none, and on this basis we develop a high
of morality,
but Vaihinger should not use the word morality here since it usually
indicates free will or responsibility for one’ actions which
denies.
But he says the fiction is useful, for example, in criminal law, “For if
there is to be punishment there must also be guilt, but this cannot
exist where responsibility and freedom are denied” (HV, p. 45). But
Vaihinger’ insistence that the idea of punishment must
maintained
for the protection of society seems rather cruel, because society could
be protected also by treating the criminal as if he were merely
ill, as many modern criminologists now advocate. Vaihinger’s fallaci
ous attempt to claim Kant as an ally will be treated in detail later, but
is mentioned here to show another basic contradiction, which is really
Vaihinger’ and not Kant’s. “Thus, according to Kant,” says Vai
hinger, “man is not merely to be judged in his conduct as if he were a
free agent, but should conduct himself as if, at some time or other,
he were to be held accountable for his acts” (HV, p. 47). The word
should here indicates obligation which may or may not be fulfilled and
contradictorily indicates even in this deterministic statement that man
is, to some extent at least, a free agent.
The same kind of contradiction appears in Vaihinger’s account
of our psyche. “The psyche,” he says, “must therefore be regarded as
a machine, not only
it works according to psycho-mechanical
and psycho-chemical laws, but in the sense that its natural forces are
intensified
these mechanical processes” (HV, p. 101). In other
words he is here a pure determinist, but on the same page he says that
just as “man is continually perfecting his machines,” so “the psyche is
always perfecting its mechanisms. . . . Thus the psyche is a machine
which is continually improving itself . . .” (HV, p. 101). There is
certainly confusion here. To say that the psyche improves itself
would seem to give it a certain amount of initiative
it could
not have if it were actuated
by “psycho-mechanical and psycho
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chemical laws.” We might reconcile this contradiction in part by as
suming that the mechanical processes, derived from what Vaihinger
calls elsewhere “immanent necessity” (a kind of beneficent elan vital) ,
operate on the psyche to improve its efficiency, but on the next page
this partial reconciliation is made impossible when Vaihinger says
that “The proper task of methodology is to teach us to manipulate
this instrument, this thought-machine” (HV, p. 102). Freedom, he
maintains, is a fiction, and yet somebody (presumably Vaihinger) can
work out a methodology from
we can learn “to manipulate this
instrument, this thought-machine.” There are three instances of free
dom here: (1) “our” teacher of methodology, who may or may not
work out this methodology; (2) “we,” who may or may not elect to
learn it and who (3) may or may not elect to use our knowledge and
power after we receive it. But if we do manipulate this “thought
machine,” we
be using a great amount of freedom.
Vaihinger contradicts himself even about contradictions. On one
page he says, “The main result of our investigation is, then, that
contradiction is the driving force of thought and that without it
thought could not attain its goal at all . . . what we generally call
truth . . . is merely the most expedient error. . . . So-called agree
ment with reality must finally be abandoned as a criterion” (HV, p.
108). But on the very next page he says:
All departures from reality and all self-contradictions are
logical errors of the first degree . . . these errors must be
cancelled, because otherwise the fictions would be valueless
and harmful. ... If, in fictions, thought contradicts
reality, or even if it contradicts itself, and if in spite of this
questionable procedure it nevertheless succeeds in corre
sponding to reality, then this deviation must have been
corrected and the contradiction must have been made good.
(HV, p. 109).
Thought must correspond to reality, he says here, but on the previous
page he has said that “agreement with reality must finally be aban
doned as a criterion.” And if all departures from reality are mis
takes, then it would seem that fictions, defined by Vaihinger elsewhere
as “consciously false assumptions, which either contradict reality or
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are even contradictory in themselves” (HV, pp. xlvi-xlvii), would cer
tainly be mistakes and the thesis of his whole book would be cancelled.
Keeping in mind Vaihinger’s original definition of fictions as
“hypotheses which are known to
false but which are used because
of their utility,” it would seem that he also almost breaks
his
theory in the following statement: “The mind has a tendency to bring
all ideational contents into equilibrium and to establish an unbroken
connection between them. An hypothesis is inimical to this tendency
in so far as it involves the idea that it is not to be placed on an
equality with the other objective ideas” (HV, p. 125). He then admits
that a fiction even more than an hypothesis “interferes with the
tendency toward an equilibration of ideational constructs. The hy
pothesis only hampers this adjustment negatively and indirectly, but
the fiction hampers it directly and positively” (HV, p. 126). But a
great part of his argument for fictions has been their “utility” in
smoothing out thought processes in spite of the fact that they are
“consciously false assumptions, which either contradict reality or are
even contradictory in themselves . . .” (HV, pp. xlvi-xlvii). In fact,
just five pages beyond his above statement about fiction “interfering
directly and positively with the tendency toward an equilibration of
ideational constructs,” he seems to reverse himself by considering
fictions as beneficial in promoting the working of the “law of the
resolution of psychical tension”: “One beneficial effect is that by
this tendency to adjustment dogmas and hypotheses are, where possible
or expedient, transformed into fictions. For so long as these ideational
constructs are supposed to have objective value, contradictions and
difficulties arise which disappear if we regard them as mere fictions”
(HV, p. 133). Once more Vaihinger has contradicted himself about
contradictions as well as about the effect on the psyche of fictions.
Again in this same chapter entitled “The Law of Ideational
Shifts,” Vaihinger’s attitude toward the history of religions seems
ambiguous if not actually contradictory. He has all along indicated
that to consider religious dogma as fiction is not only the best but
indeed the only proper way to consider it. He agrees with the
philosopher Forberg that “it is not a duty to believe that there exists
a moral world-government or a God as moral world-ruler; our duty is
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simply to act as if we believed it” (HV, p. 323). He has, as we have
seen, even gone so far as to say that “as soon as this as if is trans
formed into a because, its purely ethical character vanishes and it
becomes simply a matter of our
interests, mere egotism” (HV,
p. 49)—
would certainly imply that the quality of religion
vastly improved when the because, which sometimes comes first, is
transformed into an as if,
“small psychical artifice . . . becomes
the origin of all the idealistic belief and behaviour of mankind”
(HV, p. 49). That is, belief and behaviour based on God, immortality,
reward, punishment, etc., as hypotheses are not really idealistic; indeed
their ethical character is “destroyed.” Keeping in mind his repeated
emphasis on the above ideas, it is curious that he definitely connects
his “law of ideational shifts” with the “decline and break-up” (one
would have expected him to say “the great improvement”) of religion
(the shift being from dogma to hypothesis to fiction as the religion

as
age.
ideas
which
system,
nes more and more). “At first,” he says,
all religion consists of general dogmas. . . . Then doubt
appears and the idea becomes an hypothesis. As doubt
grows stronger, there are some who reject the idea entirely,
while others maintain it either
a public or a private
tion. This last condition is typical of every religion so far
known when it has reached a certain
It can be seen to
great advantage in Greek religion, where the Greek folk
deities were at first general dogmas. . . . Subsequently
they became fictions for the educated classes, who adhered
tenaciously to the worship of God, or rather of the gods,
although convinced that the
represented nothing real.

The most extensive series of errors in Vaihinger’s book are re
vealed in his valiant efforts to make Kant his ally in considering as
fictions rather than hypotheses the Thing-in-itself, God, immortality,
liberty, and other such ideas not scientifically verifiable. In Part I he
finds himself disappointed because Kant “wavers between the Ding an
sich, as an hypothesis or a fiction” (HV, p. 74). Kant’s
says
Vaihinger, logically demanded the Ding an sich as a fiction.
Just as we introduce into mathematics and mechanics ideas
which facilitate our task, so Kant introduces a device in the
form of the concept Ding an sich, as an x to
a y,
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the ego, as our organization, corresponds. By this means
the whole world of reality can be dealt with. Subsequently
the ’ ’ and the Ding an sich are dropped, and only
sensations remain as real. From our point of view the
sequence of
constitutes ultimate reality, and
two poles are mentally added, subject and object. (HV,
pp. 75-76)

This kind of temporary use of the Ding an sich, Vaihinger is saying,
like the temporary use of “fictitious constructs—space, matter, etc.,”
mentioned above, would have done Kant credit. In other
the
Thing-in-itself would have been “the most brilliant of all conceptual
instruments” if Kant had used it temporarily as a fiction so that “the
whole world” might “appear to be understood as an effect,” and if
he had then dropped it to accept the mature wisdom of Vaihinger’s
basic doctrine that “only sensations remain as real.” But unfortunately
Kant “did not adhere to this definite standpoint, but his Ding an sich
were an hypothesis,
same
e a reality, in short
his hesitating
dis
which
ethics, and ahence
words,
cussion
of the concept
” (HV, p. 76). “The great philosopher stained
his
glorious discoveries by clinging to effete rationalistic dogmas and
thus himself contributed to the fate of his true achievement,
was consigned to oblivion” (HV, p. 30).
Vaihinger can never, in Part I of his book, stop chiding Kant for
not consistently maintaining the point of view that his scientifically
unverifiable ideas were fictions. Though the misguided Kant did not
consistently hold to this view, in
for example, Vaihinger states
what constitutes the real principle of Kantian ethics,
namely, that true morality must always rest upon a fictional
basis. All the hypothetical bases, God, immortality, reward,
punishment, etc., destroy its ethical character, i. e. we must
act with the same seriousness and the
scruples as if the
duty
imposed by God. . . . But
soon as this as if
is transformed into a because, its purely ethical character
vanishes and it becomes simply matter of our lower inter
ests, mere egotism. (HV, p. 49)

In other
Vaihinger is saying that all the religious believers,
including the great saints, who have not regarded as fictions “the
hypothetical bases, God, immortality, reward, punishment, etc.,” have
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acted out of 'lower interests, mere egotism.” This would of course
include Christ himself.
Another slightly puzzling idea in the above explanation of what,
even if Kant did not have insight enough to maintain it, constitutes
“the real principle of Kantian ethics” is the statement that “true
morality must always rest upon a fictional basis.” But why, one
wonders, cannot the fiction of morality, as Vaihinger has argued for
the Thing-in-itself, be kept up only temporarily until the psyche is
ready for the mature
of his doctrine that “only sensations
remain as real”? Perhaps we will understand the distinction in due
time. In the meantime, it is pleasant to contemplate the soaring elo
quence of his next sentence: “Thus, before our very eyes, does a small
psychical artifice not only develop into a mighty source of the whole
theoretical explanation of the world—for all categories arise from it—
but it also becomes the origin of all the idealistic belief and behaviour
of mankind” (HV, p. 49).
Now since such wonderful results flow from this “small
artifice,” he generously decides that Kant after all must have really
meant to be an “As-Ifer” in Vaihinger’s sense of the term and devotes
forty-seven pages of Part III to arguing thus. It is my firm belief
that Vaihinger is mistaken in maintaining that Kant ever considered
his transcendental ideas fictions, in Vaihinger’s sense of fictions as
mental constructs known to be false. First, I
three passages early
in The Critique of Pure Reason,
appeared in 1781 and to which
Vaihinger devotes more attention than to any other of Kant’s works.
First, Kant makes it clear that he regards things in themselves as real
in the following passage: “The estimate of our rational cognition
a priori at which we arrive that it has only to do with phenomena,
and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence [italics
mine] lie beyond its sphere.”7 Again, on the next page
says:
. . . while we surrender the power of cognizing, we still
reserve the power of thinking objects, as things in them
selves. ... In order to cognize an object, I must be able
to prove its possibility, either from its reality as attested by
experience,
a priori, by means of reason. But I can
think what I please, provided ... my conception is a
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possible thought, though I may be unable to
for the
existence of a corresponding object in the sum of possi
bilities. But something more is required before I can at
tribute to such a conception objective validity. ... We
are not however confined to theoretical sources of cognition
for the means of satisfying this additional requirement,
but may derive them from practical sources. (Critique, p. 9)

Kant’s whole effort in his approach to the subject of God, freedom,
immortality, etc., was to “satisfy this additional requirement”
that
he could attribute to his concepts the “real possibility” of “objective
validity.”
And the third passage occurs on the next page, where he says, “I
must, therefore, abolish knowledge, to make room for belief”
(Critique, p. 10). He certainly
not abolishing knowledge to make
room for fictions in Vaihinger’s sense of the term, and it is clear that
when Kant uses the word which is translated fiction he is using it as
synonymous with hypothesis.
I have quoted these passages from the first few pages of the
Critique of Pure Reason to indicate that Vaihinger
mistaken in
thinking that Kant even began with the idea of the Thing-in-itself
as a fiction.
Vaihinger, even in dealing with this work which seems most to
favor his view of Kant, carefully selects a few sections for comment
and from these quotes portions of passages
seem to make Kant
an “As-Ifer” in Vaihinger’ sense of the term. But even on the ground
selected by Vaihinger his interpretation will not work. He first selects
the section entitled “The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis.”
“Near the beginning of the section,” Vaihinger says, “we find the
'rational concepts’ described as 'mere ideas,’
'heuristic fictions,’ and
expressly distinguished from hypotheses” (HV, p. 272). But this
exactly what Kant has not done, as would be indicated in the very
title of this section, the first paragraph of which reads as follows:
This critique of reason has now taught us that all its
efforts to extend the bounds of knowledge, by means of pure
speculation, are utterly fruitless. So much the wider field, it
may appear, lies open to hypothesis; as, where we cannot
know with certainty, we are at liberty to make guesses and
to form suppositions. (Critique, p. 227)
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And the whole section
devoted to this procedure.
In the paragraph referred to by Vaihinger, Kant is concerned as
always to make it clear that
hypotheses about the realm of pure
reason (the noumena) do not apply in the phenomenal world. “The
conceptions of reason are, as we have already shown, mere ideas, and
do not relate to any object in any kind of experience.” But “mere
ideas” are not fictions in Vaihinger’s sense of the term. When Kant
says that they “cannot be employed as hypotheses in the explanation of
real phenomena,” he is emphasizing, as he does throughout this para
graph, that one must go as far as possible in the phenomenal world
and not confuse it with the noumenal. The noumenal world, though
not demonstrable, Kant
considered as necessary, universal, and
real in its sphere. Each object indeed has a sensuous character and an
intelligible character, the latter by no means to be considered as
“imaginary” in spite of the fact that it cannot
experienced as a
“real phenomenon.” In the past part (entitled “Scepticism not a
Permanent State for Human Reason”) of Section II immediately
preceding this section discussed by Vaihinger, Kant finds Hume
defective on this very point. Hume mistakenly “believed he could
infer that, without experience, we possess no source from which we
can augment a conception, and no ground sufficient to justify us in
framing a judgment that is to extend our cognition
priori”
(Critique, p. 226). Vaihinger would take us right back into Hume’s
error of regarding the ultimate reality as phenomenal, a conclusion
which Kant opposes with all his might.
There are undoubtedly some fields in which fictions in Vaihinger’s
sense are useful, as, for example, the
in the German Commercial
Code which provided (at the time Vaihinger was writing, about 1875)
that “goods not returned to the sender within the proper time are to
be regarded as if the recipient had definitely authorized and accepted
them” (HV, p. 35). In mathematics also such fictional constructs as
negative, irrational, and imaginary numbers, as Vaihinger says, “possess
great value for the advancement of science and the generalization of
its results in spite of the crass contradictions
they contain”
(HV, p. 57). But granted the limited procedural usefulness of fic
tions in the sciences, mathematics, jurisprudence, and certain other
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fields, Vaihinger’s mistake lies in pushing his theory too far into the
philosophy of religion, in which analogies with these other fields must
be handled with great caution. Vaihinger is correct in saying repeat
edly that “Without the imaginary factor neither science nor life in
their [sic] highest form are [sic] possible” (HV, p. 44). But the
question whether the imagination employed in religious speculation,
which forms a very important part of Vaihinger’ concern with life,
issues in hypotheses or fictions. As Vaihinger has well said, an
hypothesis sometimes becomes “degraded” into a fiction, but he at the
same time seems to feel that such a change is really progress. I should
agree that it well for an honest man to know when an hypothesis
is no longer valid as such (that is, cannot lead into eventual truth),
but when it is definitely discarded as an hypothesis, then it has little
value, either practically or theoretically, in philosophy or religion.
Most intelligent people surely cannot shape their lives ultimately
around ideas which in their opinion are fictions, though it amazing
how many think they are doing so. Kant may have been wrong, but
at least he “abolished knowledge, to make room for belief” not for
fictions in Vaihinger’s sense. The beliefs for
Kant thus made
room
the traditional ones in God, freedom, and immortality.
Many modem philosophers have acknowledged the genius of Kant’s
destruction of knowledge about metaphysics but have not been much
impressed with his back door return to faith through moralism. It is
strange, however, that some who thus condemn Kant will accept as
perfectly convincing a system like that of Vaihinger. Such a
would appear to be indeed a desperate shift—evidence of the last stage
of a culture when many sophisticated thinkers, having lost religious
faith, cannot abide the consequences of its disappearance and have
taken a precarious refuge under the flimsy shelter of fictions—a
procedure in some respects fully as naive as primitive word-magic.
Language, the ultimate reality through “autonomous” symbolism, is
our refuge; such is the message of a prominent school of modem
philosophers.8 The same idea is a fundamental one for I. A. Richards,
who has an international reputation as a psychologist, literary critic,
and poet, and who can speak with authority for a large group in each
of these three fields. Richards in his Coleridge on the Imagination
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speaks almost ecstatically about the prospect of “a general theoretical
study of language capable of opening to us new powers over our
minds comparable to those which systematic physical inquiries are
giving us over our environment.”9 For Richards the gospel of language
will take the form of poetry (this of course in the tradition of Matthew
Arnold’s Literature and Dogma and much speculation since that time):
“If philosophic contemplation, or religious experience, or science gave
Reality,” says Richards,
then poetry gave us something of less consequence, at
some sort of shadow. If we grant that all is myth,
poetry, as the myth-making which most brings 'the whole
soul of man into activity’ . . . becomes the necessary
channel for the reconstitution of order . . . poetry . . .
will remake our minds and with them our world.10

But other poets, though like Richards in proclaiming the gospel of
poetry, seem considerably less happy about it than he. In the sinuous
paradoxes of Wallace Stevens—for example, his “Profundum, physical
thunder, dimensions in which we believe without belief, beyond
belief”—11 there is an undercurrent of melancholy, as, to return to
the philosophers, there certainly is in the more violent paradoxes of two
prominent modern German existentialists, Jaspers and Heidegger.
Says Jaspers: “Just
Being and Nothingness are inseparable, each
containing the other, yet each violently repelling the other, so faith
and unfaith are inseparable, yet passionately repel one another.”12 And
Heidegger:
.
Does Nothing exist only because the Not,
e., negation,
exists? Or is it the other way about? Does negation and
the Not exist only because Nothing exists? Where shall we
seek Nothing? . . . Only in the clear night of dread’s
Nothingness is what-is as such revealed in all its original
overtness: that it is ’ and is not Nothing ... the Nothing
nothings.13

All the above are various versions, differing only in tone and
degree, of the theory of fictions, even though some theorists, like
Stevens and the two German existentialists, have evolved the most
ingenious fiction of all—that their system both is and is not fiction.
There are many other modem versions of the
As-If system, and
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I propose to treat a number of them later. There are certainly enough
to justify the statements of Ogden and Gilson (quoted in the begin
ning of this essay) that the philosophy of As If is a very powerful in
fluence in our age. Apropos of all this, my contention, quite simply,
is that if one cannot believe, he must prepare himself to forego the
consolations that reward the believer, and try, even if in vain without
divine assistance, to find in human relationships a source for his
“emotional equilibration.”
xHans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As If (London, 1924), pp. xlvii-xlviii
(hereafter referred to as HV).

2Ibid., Preface, p.
3C. K. Ogden (ed.), Bentham's Theory of Fictions (London, 1932), p. cxlviii.
4Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience
pp. 294-295.
deferred to in Ogden, Introduction, p. xxxiii.

(New York, 1952),
.

6Bentham's Theory of Fictions, p. 8.
7Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, in Great Books of the Western
World (Chicago, 1952), LXII, 8—hereafter referred to as Critique.

8Cf. Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth (New York, 1946) and Mrs. Susanne
Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York, 1942), and the books to which they
refer.
9I. A. Richards, Coleridge on the Imagination (New York, 1935), p. 232.

10Ibid., pp. 228, 229.

11Quoted in Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (New York,
1953), p.
12Quoted in Hector Hawton, The Feast of Unreason (London, 1952), p. 200.
13Quoted in ibid., p. 188.
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